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This chapter briefl y addresses three themes related to the evaluation 
of active labor market programs (ALMPs), drawing on evidence from 
the North American experience and contrasting it with current practice 
in Europe.1 I begin by making the (measured) case for greater use of 
random assignment methods in Europe, including both familiar and, I 
suspect, less familiar, arguments. Second, I make the case for greater 
(which in many European countries means “any”) use of serious cost-
benefi t analysis as a component of the evaluation of ALMPs. Third, I 
discuss the organization of the evaluation “industry” in North America 
and offer some suggestions about lessons it provides for the organiza-
tion of evaluation in Europe. 
The conference came at an opportune time given the explosion in 
nonexperimental evaluation work related to ALMPs in Europe. The 
papers by Kluve (2006) and Card, Kluve, and Weber (2009) describe 
and meta-analyze this work; see also Bergemann and van den Berg 
(forthcoming). The European Social Fund surely deserves praise for 
venturing across the pond in search of ways to improve the quality and 
quantity of this evaluation work (broadly conceived to include perfor-
mance management). At the same time, I think it well worth noting that 
the United States and Canada have much to learn from the countries 
at the top of the European evaluation league tables as well. Lessons 
worth learning include both the general value of rich, well-maintained, 
and relatively accessible (to qualifi ed researchers and with appropri-
ate privacy protections) administrative data and the value of specifi c 
data elements such as caseworker ratings of the employability of the 
unemployed and detailed, complete data on educational qualifi cations. 
Though this view may generate some controversy, I read the recent 
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nonexperimental evaluations of WIA by Heinrich et al. (2009) and 
Hollenbeck (2009) as indicating that existing U.S. administrative data 
systems do not quite have what it takes to provide compelling impact 
estimates. Perhaps this is not surprising given that the design of current 
U.S. administrative data systems did not include program evaluation as 
an objective. On another policy dimension, certain European countries 
have also done a good job of implementing, documenting, and studying 
regimes of sanctions for benefi t recipients not suffi ciently inspired by 
the “carrot” side of activation policies. Recent examples here include 
Arni, Lalive, and van Ours (2009), Boockmann, Thomsen, and Walter 
(2009), and Svarer (2007). The United States has sanctions in some 
programs, but to my knowledge, not much in the way of good data on 
them or—what follows immediately from the lack of good data—good 
studies. A related but different point concerns the sometime confl ation 
in these sorts of discussions of U.S. policy with optimal policy. I make 
neither the claim that current U.S. policy is optimal in any meaningful 
sense for the current U.S. context or that all or even most of the good 
things about current U.S. evaluation policy can easily transfer to Eu-
rope. Nonetheless, I will argue for the view that some aspects of U.S. 
policy and practice suggest reforms worth considering in some (if not 
all) European countries.
The tremendous heterogeneity among European countries in the 
current state of research evaluating the performance of ALMPs and, 
more broadly, the heterogeneity in the relevant political and research 
institutions and in evaluation capacity also deserve note. Some Euro-
pean countries remain at the very beginning of the process of seriously 
evaluating their programs, while others have much to teach the North 
Americans. It nearly goes without saying that different aspects of the 
North American experience have relevance to different countries in Eu-
rope, depending on the current state of play in those countries.
Even on the topics directly covered in this chapter, much remains 
unsaid due to space limitations. In addition, I have not considered a 
variety of other topics closely related to the evaluation of ALMPs, such 
as recent developments in the literature regarding data and methods 
for nonexperimental evaluations (see, e.g., Dolton and Smith [2010]; 
Fredriksson and Johansson [2008]; Sianesi [2004]); performance 
management (see, e.g., Radin [2006]; Barnow and Smith [2004]; and 
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith [2002]); statistical treatment rules (see, 
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e.g., Smith and Staghøj [2009] and the references therein); and the 
broader issue of the role of caseworkers as gatekeepers, monitors, and 
information providers (see, e.g., Lechner and Smith [2007] and Buur-
man and Dur [2008]). These omissions refl ect not lack of interest or 
importance but rather division of labor over time and among authors.2
EXPERIMENTATION
As a quick perusal of the Digest of the Social Experiments (Green-
berg and Shroder 2004) makes clear, the United States has conducted 
the vast majority (indeed, all but a handful) of social experiments, most 
of them related to active labor market programs, primary and secondary 
education, and the criminal justice system.3 The situation has not re-
ally changed since the publication of that volume. In the United States, 
experiments have provided evidence of great value for both policy and 
for our understanding of social interventions more broadly in areas as 
diverse as health insurance, electricity pricing, responses to domestic 
violence, educational interventions related to teachers, schools, and 
curricula, and of course, ALMPs. Widely hailed in the social science 
community (see, e.g., Burtless and Orr [1986] and Burtless [1995]), the 
key advantage of social experiments is that their simple design makes 
them easy to explain and hard to argue with. This gives them a policy-
infl uencing power not enjoyed by even the cleanest nonexperimental 
designs.
In addition to these direct benefi ts, experiments have the under-
appreciated benefi t of providing high-quality data for other research 
purposes. In addition to the large literature that uses experimental im-
pact estimates as a benchmark for the study of various combinations of 
nonexperimental estimators and data (see, e.g., LaLonde [1986], Fraker 
and Maynard [1987], Heckman and Hotz [1989], Friedlander and 
Robins [1995], Dehejia and Wahba [1999, 2002], and Smith and Todd 
[2005a,b]), experiments also have yielded a lot of substantive knowl-
edge, particularly about low-income labor markets, and have provided 
a platform for methodological analyses of heterogeneous treatment 
effects that avoid the complications associated with fi rst dealing with 
selection bias (see, e.g., Heckman, Smith, and Clements [1997], Bitler, 
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Gelbach, and Hoynes [2006], and Djebbari and Smith [2008]). Ex-
perimental data have even helped researchers to learn about structural 
models (in the sense that economists used that term), as in Todd and 
Wolpin (2006) and Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004).
The literature documents a variety of limitations of experimental 
evaluations relative to nonexperimental evaluations. These limitations 
weigh against the advantages just discussed. At a most basic level, 
technological, political, and ethical concerns make it impossible to 
randomly assign some treatments of great interest, such as gender or 
family background. Except in unusual circumstances, such as the Pro-
gresa evaluation in Mexico, where random assignment took place at the 
level of relatively isolated villages, experimental evaluations capture 
only the partial equilibrium effects of policies (see Angelucci and di 
Giorgio [2009]). Depending on the placement of random assignment 
in the process of treatment receipt and on the availability of substitutes 
from other sources, both treatment group dropout and control group 
substitution often complicate the interpretation of the estimates from 
experimental evaluations of ALMPs (see the discussions in Heckman, 
Smith, and Taber [1998] and Heckman et al. [2000]). 
The implementation of random assignment sometimes requires in-
stitutional changes that may compromise external validity. In the case 
of the National JTPA Study (NJS), the local sites in the experiment were 
concerned that the requirement of the design that they serve roughly the 
same number of participants while also fi lling a control group would 
mean digging deeper into the pool of potential participants. Depend-
ing on the nature of this pool and of the selection process, doing so 
could mean serving people with lower expected impacts. Some sites 
reacted to this by changing the nature of their selection process, e.g., 
reducing the number of visits to the center required to enroll, so as 
to reduce the extent of attrition during the process. Obviously, such 
changes compromise the external validity of the results. The scientifi c 
and political desirability of using volunteer sites also has implications 
for external validity. As documented in Doolittle and Traeger (1990), 
in the NJS, more than 200 of the (approximately) 600 local service 
delivery areas were contacted, and a substantial amount of money was 
spent on side payments in order to induce 16 sites to volunteer to par-
ticipate, and even then at least one site left the experiment early. This 
issue often arises in evaluations of educational interventions conducted 
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by the Institute of Education Sciences (IES) at the U.S. Department of 
Education as well. A related but different point is that heterogeneity in 
the size and organization of local sites may limit the set of sites at which 
it makes budgetary sense to do random assignment. The presence of 
random assignment may also alter the behavior of potential participants 
in ways that less salient and intrusive nonexperimental methods might 
not. For example, it might induce additional selection on risk aversion, 
or it might deter complementary investments. Such changes, sometimes 
dubbed “randomization bias” in the literature, are distinct from Haw-
thorne effects, which result from the mere fact of observation, and pose 
yet another threat to external validity. Heckman and Smith (1995) and 
Section 5 of Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) summarize these 
concerns about experiments.
In addition to these real issues, policymakers and program adminis-
trators sometimes offer ethical objections to random assignment. In my 
experience, these objections nearly always represent a cover for simply 
not wanting to know the answer. Experiments often provide compel-
ling evidence that treatments do not work at all or do not work well 
enough to pass a cost-benefi t test. Educational researchers have dubbed 
the What Works Clearinghouse, a formal compendium of quality-
rated evidence on the impacts of educational treatments funded by 
the IES and operated by Mathematica Policy Research, the “Nothing 
Works Clearinghouse.”4 This usage illustrates the very real empirical 
pattern that many, maybe most, programs fail when subjected to seri-
ous evaluation. Programs that deliver ineffective treatments, and thus 
do not benefi t their participants, still benefi t important constituencies, 
such as the workers and agencies or fi rms that provide the treatments. 
Indeed, one sometimes suspects that it is these constituencies, and not 
the population served, who represent the real reason for the program’s 
existence in the fi rst place. These constituencies have an interest in the 
production of low-quality (and sometimes deliberately manipulated), 
nonexperimental evaluations and misleading performance measures in 
place of compelling experimental (or even nonexperimental) evidence. 
One way to confront these specious ethical arguments is to point 
out what they miss, namely the problematic ethical position of forc-
ing taxpayers to fund programs without any serious evidence that they 
pass cost-benefi t tests when such evidence could easily be produced. 
Such “speaking truth to power” provides the warm glow of righteous 
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satisfaction and carries some sway with stakeholders not completely in 
the service of their own narrow interests, but it does not always carry 
the day.
Variants of random assignment that do not require the complete 
denial of service to any potential clients constitute another response to 
the phony ethical arguments offered up against random assignment, as 
these arguments typically revolve around concerns about service denial. 
In contexts where some eligible individuals would not receive service 
anyway, advocates of serious evaluation can (and do) frame random as-
signment as an equitable way to allocate scarce resources. In contexts 
where resource constraints do not bind, variants of random assignment 
that do not assign anyone to a no-services control group can help to 
derail malicious objections.
The literature offers three variants of random assignment that (more 
or less) avoid a no-treatment control group. One rather obvious vari-
ant consists of random assignment with multiple treatment arms but 
no control arm. For example, in the WIA context one might randomly 
assign some clients to only core and intensive services, while excluding 
them from training services. Another variant consists of a randomized 
encouragement design, as in Hirano et al. (2000). Here eligible indi-
viduals get randomly assigned an incentive to participate. Thus, no one 
is excluded, but the incentive, when properly designed—learning about 
the impact of the incentive represents a side benefi t of the design—
induces exogenous variation in treatment status. The design identifi es 
what the literature calls the local average treatment effect (LATE) rather 
than the average treatment effect on the treated. Put less technically, this 
design identifi es the mean impact on those induced to participate by the 
incentive, but not the mean impact on all participants. Whether or not 
this parameter merits attention depends on the particular policy context. 
The fi nal design consists of randomization at the margin, as in Black 
et al. (2003). This design does create a no-treatment control group, but 
only of individuals on the margin of participation. In the case of the 
Kentucky Worker Profi ling and Reemployment Services System ana-
lyzed in Black et al. (2003), the margin consists of individuals whose 
predicted durations of benefi t receipt put them in the last cell of treated 
individuals in a given local offi ce in a given week. The state was willing 
to randomize these individuals but not those with long predicted spells. 
Like the randomized encouragement design, this design does not iden-
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tify the average treatment effect on the treated, but it does identify the 
average impact of treatment for individuals at the margin of treatment. 
This parameter answers a different policy question of what the mean 
impact would be on individuals brought into the program by an increase 
in the number of slots. As with the randomized encouragement design, 
this parameter might have greater or lesser policy importance than the 
average treatment effect on the treated.
The push for random assignment evaluations of ALMPs (and other 
policies as well) ultimately has great value. For example, the zero (and 
sometimes negative) impact estimates for youth in the NJS led to large 
budget cuts in that program—cuts an order of magnitude larger than the 
cost of this (quite expensive) evaluation; see the discussion in Heck-
man and Krueger (2003). The experimental fi ndings from the National 
Job Corps Study presented in Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 
(2008), which include positive impacts that fade out and so fail to pass 
a cost-benefi t test given the high cost of the program, have led to some 
serious thinking about that popular and, prior to the evaluation, essen-
tially untouchable program. Some of the IES experimental evaluation 
results, such as those for the Teach for America Program (Glazerman, 
Mayer, and Decker 2005), abstinence-only sex education programs 
(Trenholm et al. 2008), reading and mathematics software (Campuzano 
et al. 2009), and intensive teacher mentoring programs (Eisenberg et 
al. 2009), have had real impacts on expenditures and on the course of 
policy innovation and research. The Europeans can and should get in on 
this worthwhile game.
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Cost-benefi t analysis combines impact estimates with information 
on program costs to produce a direct policy conclusion. In the case 
of impact estimates that capture the average effect of treatment on the 
treated, a comparison of the impacts with the average cost of the pro-
gram provides a clear and direct message about the value of a program 
to the taxpayers who fund it. Historically, many U.S. evaluations have 
included at least rudimentary cost-benefi t analyses. The cost-benefi t 
analysis associated with the National Job Corps Study presented in 
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Schochet, Burghardt and McConnell (2006) represents a particularly 
fi ne example. 
In contrast, one can look pretty hard and not fi nd very many Eu-
ropean ALMP evaluations that include serious cost-benefi t analyses. 
Munch, Skipper, and Jespersen (2008) provide a notable Danish ex-
ample, while Raaum, Torp, and Zhang (2002) do the same for Norway. 
Osikominu (2009) shows a more common situation, with only a very 
rudimentary comparison of costs and impacts. More generally, and de-
spite these counterexamples, the modal European ALMP evaluation, at 
least in my experience, contains no cost-benefi t analysis at all. 
A number of reasons are given for the absence of cost-benefi t anal-
ysis in European evaluations of ALMPs, the most common of which 
concerns the European focus on employment impacts, rather than 
earnings impacts, mainly for political reasons. This focus on employ-
ment has led to a lack of good administrative data on earnings in some 
countries, which makes cost-benefi t analysis more challenging, as the 
researcher (or the literature more broadly) must come up with a com-
pelling way to translate employment impacts into monetary units. In 
contrast, impacts on earnings, the most common case in North America, 
fi t easily into a cost-benefi t framework. Another reason sometimes 
given for the absence of cost-benefi t analyses in Europe relates to the 
fact that the estimated employment impacts often turn out negative or 
zero or, in the bright and sunny cases, positive but small enough to make 
the negative result that would emerge from a serious cost-benefi t analy-
sis obvious in advance. This is the “why bother when the programs do 
not really work anyway” argument, and it has some sense to it.
The lack of good cost data also poses a barrier to serious cost-benefi t 
analysis in many European contexts (and some North American ones 
as well). Ideally, one would have detailed data on both average and 
marginal costs for each service offered, broken down geographically 
in cases where costs varied substantially by, for example, location in a 
large city, a small city, or a rural area. Instead, researchers often have 
available little more than the program budget and the total number of 
persons served. 
Both JTPA and WIA have attempted performance standards mea-
sures that included a cost component. These have faced real diffi culties 
in assigning costs shared by JTPA or WIA and other programs, as when 
a variety of programs, often each having multiple funding sources, all 
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share a common physical location as a One-Stop center. These common 
cost allocation issues (and others) are real and challenging, and carry 
over directly from performance measures to the problem of creating 
meaningful cost information for use in cost-benefi t calculations. At the 
same time, private fi rms face similar diffi culties and a large literature 
and equally large body of empirical practice in accounting lay out rea-
sonable ways to deal with them. 
In addition to its value at informing decisions about keeping or 
dropping programs, cost-benefi t analysis has the further benefi t of 
encouraging thinking about important aspects of program design and 
evaluation, and of public policy more generally. First, it encourages 
thinking about the outcomes an ALMP will affect. A focus on outcomes 
other than just earnings, in particular on crime, represents one of the 
notable aspects of the Job Corp cost-benefi t analysis highlighted earlier. 
Not only do impacts on crime account for much of the gross impact of 
the program, particularly in the short term, their presence tells us a lot 
about how the program works, and suggests other possible treatments 
that might well pass a cost-benefi t analysis. 
Thinking about outcomes and about the behavioral theory that links 
treatments to outcomes also leads to a salutary focus on the possible 
general equilibrium effects (which include spillovers or displacement 
effects) of programs. Johnson (1980) and Calmfors (1994) are classic 
references; see Lise, Seitz, and Smith (2004) and the citations it con-
tains for pointers to the more recent (and still much too small) literature. 
While diffi cult to estimate, they deserve a place in cost-benefi t analy-
ses, if only in the form of a sensitivity analysis using informal estimates 
drawn from the broader literature.
Thinking about cost-benefi t analysis in a serious way also high-
lights the importance of learning about the duration of program impacts. 
Most evaluations of ALMPs provide only a year or two of follow-up. 
The available evidence on longer-term impacts suggests that sometimes 
impacts remain remarkably steady over time for years after an interven-
tion, as in the National Supported Work Demonstration (Couch 1992) 
and the National JTPA Study (GAO 1996); other times they fade out, as 
in the National Job Corps Study (Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 
2008) and the California GAIN program (Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman, 
2006); and other times they appear only belatedly, as in the evalua-
tion of German training programs by Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch 
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(2004). The absence of both a clear general empirical pattern and com-
pelling theory on when estimates should persist and when not suggests 
the value of more frequently undertaking long-term follow-up, so as to 
minimize the impact of extrapolation of the sort described in Heckman, 
LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
Finally, paying attention to cost-benefi t analysis focuses policy and 
research attention on two important parameters: the discount rate and 
the marginal social cost of public funds or “excess burden.” Having a 
well-justifi ed social discount rate for use in government budgeting and 
investment decisions represents a basic task of public fi nance econo-
mists. As noted in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), the discount 
rate employed to bring future net impacts (and costs, if applicable) for-
ward in time to the present can affect the outcome of a cost-benefi t 
analysis. Also important, and routinely ignored in North American cost-
benefi t analyses (including otherwise exemplary ones like that from the 
Job Corp evaluation), is the fact that a dollar of government budget for 
ALMPs costs society more than a dollar, both because the operation of 
the tax system directly consumes real resources (all those cheery Inter-
nal Revenue Service agents have to get paid) and because all developed 
countries rely on distortionary tax systems. While estimates of the mar-
ginal social cost of public funds vary widely in the literature even for 
specifi c countries, and we would expect them to vary across countries 
due to differences in tax systems and tax rates and other institutional 
features, the estimates never equal zero and often reach magnitudes 
that suggest the policy importance of incorporating this factor into cost-
benefi t analyses and thereby into decisions about program existence 
and funding (see, e.g., Auerbach and Hines [2002] for a survey). 
In sum, cost-benefi t analysis represents a useful tool, both in a di-
rect sense via its role in clarifying and systematizing decisions about 
program existence, expansion, or contraction, and indirectly via its 
direction of policy and research attention to important, but often ne-
glected, issues of program design and impact and of public fi nance 
more broadly.
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ORGANIZING EVALUATION RESEARCH
Surprisingly little research seeks to document and explain differ-
ences in the quantity and quality of ALMP evaluation across countries. I 
am aware of Riddell (1991) and not much else. Given the heterogeneity 
in both quality and quantity obvious even to the most casual observer, 
this gap in the literature comes as a surprise. Filling the gap represents 
a worthy task for researchers. Because of this gap, my remarks here 
rely mainly on my own observations as a scholar studying evaluation 
methods, a provider of evaluation short courses to graduate students 
at various locations in Europe, a referee and editor handling academic 
evaluations, and an occasional evaluation consultant as well as on 
discussions with friends in the academic and policy worlds. The lack 
of quantitative evidence on national variation in quality and quantity 
necessitates the following caveat: I am well aware that low-quality re-
search, such as PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004, p. 15), with its smiley 
faces and confusion of outcome levels and impacts, or Gregory (2000), 
with its distinctive “sites of oppression matrix” evaluation tool, appear 
everywhere, including the United States and Canada, because of the 
universal demand for evaluation reports that promote the views of inter-
ested parties while providing an appearance of technical understanding 
and objectivity suffi cient to fool the reading public. 
I will argue that differences in the quality and quantity of evalu-
ation research across countries result from much more than simply 
differences in the industrial organization of the evaluation industry, 
but those differences play a role and make a good place to start my 
discussion. The evaluation industry in the United States combines gov-
ernment, private for-profi t fi rms, private nonprofi t fi rms, and academia 
in remarkable and complex ways that differ across program types. For 
ALMPs, both nonprofi t and for-profi t fi rms, operating on contract to the 
USDOL, have undertaken many of the evaluations of large programs 
such as JTPA, WIA, the Job Corps, the Trade Adjustment Act, and so 
on. Additional evaluation work is performed by academics operating 
with research funding from places like the National Science Founda-
tion or private foundations; this work often uses data from the original 
USDOL-funded evaluations, as with the long series of papers by Heck-
man and various coauthors using the data from the NJS; see Heckman 
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et al. (1998) for an example. Other evaluation work, including process 
evaluation work, is also often contracted out to a somewhat wider set 
of fi rms than the small number of large fi rms (e.g., Abt, Mathematica, 
MDRC, etc.) with the capacity to undertake large evaluations. These 
fi rms compete in both the product market and the labor market; at least 
in regard to economists, they compete for the same newly minted doc-
torates as academic economics departments just outside the top 20. 
Some evaluation work is also done in-house at the USDOL, whose staff 
includes people trained in economics at the doctoral level. A similar 
pattern holds in the education world, though probably with more aca-
demic involvement in the actual performance of the evaluation work, 
as opposed to simply advising or undertaking secondary analyses using 
the data generated by evaluations conducted by others.
What makes the European evaluation market different from the 
North American ones? First, some European countries have an impor-
tant player in their markets that is absent in the United States in the form 
of (mostly or entirely) government-supported research institutes de-
voted to labor market policy and evaluation that operate (more or less) 
at “arm’s length” from the government itself. I have in mind here the 
IFAU in Sweden and the various institutes in Germany (e.g., the ZEW 
in Mannheim, the IZA in Bonn, the DIW in Berlin, and the RWI in 
Essen). My understanding is that these institutes both have base fund-
ing and do work on contract. They maintain a remarkable degree of 
independence, in the sense that they routinely report evaluation results 
indicating that ALMPs have zero or even negative impacts (and other 
more humorous but still somewhat embarrassing-to-the-government 
fi ndings such as paternal leave being more common during hunting 
season and such like). 
Neither the United States nor Canada has any direct analog to these 
institutes. The GAO does some work along the lines of process and 
implementation evaluation, but not much in the way of econometric 
impact evaluation.5 The closest analogue in Canada, the Auditor Gen-
eral, is even less like the European Institutes. The U.S. Congressional 
Research Service largely confi nes itself to literature surveys. While I 
could imagine the Canadians setting up something like the IFAU, I fi nd 
it hard to imagine the United States doing so, in part because it would 
present real competition to the various DC think tanks. These institutes 
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represent a valuable component of the European scene, and countries 
that do not have them ought to reconsider.
Size represents a second important contrast between the evaluation 
market in the United States and that in Europe (and in Canada, for that 
matter). Size has two relevant dimensions here. The fi rst is the simple 
magnitude of evaluation research going on. The United States spends 
quite a lot of money on evaluation in a number of policy areas, includ-
ing for programs that it funds in developing countries. To the extent that 
evaluation fi rms, whether for-profi t or not-for-profi t, have economies of 
scale over some range, a larger market can support more fi rms and thus 
allow more competition between fi rms. The second dimension of size 
concerns the number of potential clients for evaluation research fi rms. 
My sense is that evaluation fi rms in the United States face many more 
potential clients both at the national level (where they might deal with 
the departments of labor, education, housing and urban development, 
health and human services, homeland security, transportation, agricul-
ture, and so on, and in some cases even separate parts of particular 
departments), as well as the development banks, states and larger cit-
ies, and private foundations. This diversity of potential clients reduces 
the dependence of the fi rm on repeated interactions with a single client 
and thus, I think, reduces the potential costs associated with catering 
to the truth rather than to the client agency. Firms in smaller European 
countries with highly centralized governments and no private founda-
tions may face a much, much smaller number of potential clients and 
thus face much stronger pressure to bend to the client’s wishes of the 
moment.
One easy way to increase the size of the European evaluation mar-
ket is for that market to become truly European rather than national. At 
present, I am aware of very little evaluation work that happens across 
boundaries in Europe. Transforming small national markets into a much 
larger European market would allow greater competition between pro-
viders and would give fi rms more freedom to avoid clients seeking a 
particular answer rather than necessarily the correct answer. I think en-
try by the major U.S. fi rms into the European market would aid in these 
developments. This has happened in a very limited way in the UK, with 
MDRC playing a role in the experimental evaluation of the Employ-
ment Retention and Advancement Demonstration (Miller et al. 2008). 
More activity on this front would, in my view, bring great benefi ts.6
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In this context, the Association for Public Policy and Management 
(APPAM) is important because it fosters interactions between aca-
demics, government consumers and producers of evaluation research, 
evaluation fi rms, and policy people interested in the results of evalua-
tions. Bringing these groups together, both via the annual meetings and 
via APPAM’s publications and other activities, represents an important 
contribution not duplicated, to my knowledge, by any European organi-
zation. Efforts to replicate APPAM in Europe, with some linkages and 
occasional joint conferences as with the Society for Labor Economics 
in North America and its younger European compatriot the European 
Association of Labor Economists, would add value.
Finally, you have to want it. At a narrow level, this means having 
at least some people in government who care about evidence more than 
they care about the party line or about their narrow bureaucratic impera-
tives of budget increase and career advancement. It needs to encompass 
both the levels of administration that change at election time and those 
that do not. It also means that some people at both levels have to under-
stand enough about evaluation to know what to ask for and to evaluate 
what gets produced in response. I think the U.S. practice of having seri-
ous academics spend brief stints in the national administration, say, as 
chief economist at the USDOL or on the Council of Economic Advisers, 
plays an important role in the (very much relative) success the United 
States has had on this dimension, and commend such institutions to 
European governments. The temporary nature of the appointments mat-
ters here precisely because you do not want the academics to assimilate 
into the bureaucratic culture. Rather, you want them to maintain their 
outsider perspective and their academic devotion to getting the right an-
swer (helped along by the threat of ridicule from their university friends 
and colleagues if they sell out).
The George W. Bush administration provides a useful illustration 
here. At the Labor Department, evaluation research became a low prior-
ity during this administration. More broadly, the department had such 
a poor reputation in regard to its interest in evidence that it could not 
manage to fi ll the chief economist position with a serious academic 
economist (for eight years!). Contrast this to the distinguished list of 
chief economists under Clinton, which included Larry Katz and Alan 
Krueger. In contrast, less than one mile away, the U.S. Department of 
Education—in particular, the IES under Russ Whitehurst—made a seri-
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ous run at transforming the entire fi eld of educational policy evaluation 
through a program of experimental and high-quality nonexperimental 
evaluations, as well as the funding of a training grant program to create 
a generation of new, quantitative, serious education policy evaluators 
with disciplinary roots at least partially outside of traditional schools of 
education (see the discussion in IES [2008]). How do you create more 
places like IES? I must confess that I do not have a good answer here, 
but we should be thinking about it, because doing so has a very high 
payoff indeed.
More broadly, the demand for serious program evaluation has to 
come from somewhere. It can come from leaders within government. 
It can come from actors outside government, such as the media and 
public intellectuals. It can come from the general public. But it must 
come from somewhere. Casual empiricism suggests a link at the coun-
try level between the quality and quantity of evaluation and the imprint 
of neoclassical economics. Countries with long neoclassical traditions, 
including the UK, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries, are pretty 
much the same as those with long traditions of serious research de-
voted to the evaluation of social programs. Looking within countries, 
Germany has gotten serious about empirical evaluation research only 
in the last 15 years or so, a time period that coincides with the triumph 
of neoclassical economics within academic economics in that country. 
This observed link between the demand for evaluation and neoclassi-
cal economics might refl ect a causal relationship. Alternatively, both 
demand for serious policy evaluation and the dominance of neoclassical 
economics may refl ect broader and deeper differences across countries 
in individualism, deference to authority, the importance of social class, 
average education, and so on. Regardless of whether the current rela-
tionship refl ects causality or not, one might argue that increasing the 
number of individuals trained in economics, particularly a practical 
version of economics rather than just high theory or theoretical econo-
metrics, at both the undergraduate and graduate levels might represent a 
long-term strategy for increasing the demand for quality policy evalua-
tion, as well as the ability to supply it with domestic labor. Who knows, 
it might even improve European agricultural policy as well!
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has touched on three important areas where the Eu-
ropean Social Fund can learn from the North American experience in 
evaluating ALMPs. I have argued that current European practice lies 
very far from the point where the marginal value of additional experi-
mental evaluations would equal their marginal cost. I have also argued 
that Europe would benefi t from much greater attention to careful cost-
benefi t analysis following evaluation. Such analyses would allow 
the evaluation results to provide more guidance to policy and, more 
broadly, would increase our understanding of how policy works and 
so aid in the design of future policies. Finally, I have argued that much 
room remains for improving the organization of evaluation in Europe. 
The European environment includes distinctive and valuable aspects 
not present in North America, but could usefully incorporate aspects of 
the North American experience as it seeks to improve the overall qual-
ity of European evaluations.
Notes
My thoughts on the issues discussed in this chapter have benefi ted from my interactions 
with a number of scholars over the years, including (but not limited to) Jim Heckman, 
Dan Black, Michael Lechner, Carolyn Heinrich, Burt Barnow, Lars Skipper, and Arthur 
Sweetman. I am very grateful for those interactions, and for comments from Jessica 
Goldberg, but, of course, retain all responsibility for the (occasionally provocative) 
views expressed here.
1. I use North American in the Canadian manner to mean the United States and Can-
ada but not Mexico.
2. See Smith (2000, 2004) for broad nontechnical surveys of evaluation methodol-
ogy. See Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), 
and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009) for somewhat more technical surveys. See 
Heckman and Abbring (2007) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b) for recent 
technical overviews.
3. I distinguish here between social experiments and both laboratory experiments 
under fully controlled conditions and the small-scale fi eld experiments that have 
taken the development literature by storm over the last decade. For discussions and 
categorizations, see, e.g., Levitt and List (2009) and Banerjee and Dufl o (2009).
4. The What Works Clearinghouse can be found at http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/.
up11dbwia0ch17.indd   488 6/23/2011   11:48:16 AM
Improving Impact Evaluation in Europe   489
5. For an exception, see GAO (1996), which presents long-term impact estimates for 
the JTPA experiment using administrative data.
6. This same point applies to Canada as well.
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